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Chen: Due Process as Consumer Protection

DUE PROCESS AS CONSUMER PROTECTION:
STATE REMEDIES FOR DISTANT FORUM ABUSE
by
ALAN K. CHEN"

For nearly two decades consumer protection laws have grown tremendously, with a corresponding expansion in the range of activities which fall
within the scope of such laws. From the earliest notions of common law fraud
in simple sales transactions has evolved a conglomeration of statutes, administrative rules and case law which is directed at the protection of the consumer from the point of initial solicitation or advertising to the post-sale matters of debt collection. Of particular interest in past years has been a common
method of collecting allegedly overdue consumer debts which involves the
creditor, who may often be the seller as well, suing upon consumer obligations
in forums far from the place of the consumer's residence or from where the
consumer signed the original contract. Although this practice, often called
"distant forum abuse," has been declared unfair under federal law, at least with
respect to interstate debt collection' and is prohibited with respect to thirdparty collection agencies, 2 there remains a largely unprotected area where
astute business operators can avoid these restrictions. The primary areas of
concern where consumers in many states are still without protection are intrastate debt collection suits filed by companies collecting their own debts or
the debts of an affiliated company under common ownership, or by "debt servicing" companies. Moreover, there are practical limitations upon the enforcement of federal remedies, both in terms of available resources and remedial options. These limitations give rise to the necessity of a broad remedy in state
courts which can be exercised by both state consumer protection officials and
individual citizens.
This article takes the position that distant forum abuse is a practice which
should be and can be halted by the employment of state consumer protection
statutes. The article first lays out a history of distant forum abuse and its role
as a tool for debt collection harassment. Next, it examines legal developments
in this area at both the federal and state levels, and explains the need for a
more wide-reaching remedy in most jurisdictions. The third section briefly addresses important aspects of procedural waivers under contract law which
must be taken into account by policy-makers when fashioning new remedies
for distant forum abuse. Finally, there will be a discussion of the use of the
Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act as a remedy for distant forum abuse in
Ohio. Ohio is a good example on which to focus because it is a jurisdiction
*B.A., Case Western Reserve University (1982); J.D., Stanford (1985); Law Clerk to the Hon. Marvin E.
Aspen, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois. The author wishes to thank Robert
Weisberg, Ric Sheffield and Tom McCarty, who read and commented on earlier drafts of this article.
'Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
'Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (1982).
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where the issue is still being litigated, and the question of statutory coverage in
Ohio is indicative of common problems in statutory interpretation which confront consumers in other states who wish to invoke consumer protection
statutes against distant forum debt collectors.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the late 1960s and early part of the 1970s, policy-makers at both the
federal and state levels began to express an interest and concern with the problems of the consumer-debtor. Though part of a larger consumer protection
movement, the consumer credit issue began to generate a great deal of interest
in and of itself. In 1969, the President and Congress established the National
Commission on Consumer Finance (NCCF) which was charged with the responsibility of studying various factual, economic and legal aspects of the condition of consumer credit in the United States at that time.' From a more
academic standpoint, what is considered by many to be the definitive sociological study on consumer debtors in this country was published in 1974.4
Moreover, the first pieces of major consumer credit legislation were enacted
during this period.'
The aftermath of this period has resulted in alleviation of several problematic areas of consumer credit law, yet consumers remain vulnerable in
many circumstances. Among the problems which have yet to be sufficiently
remedied is the practice of collecting allegedly defaulted debts by filing lawsuits
in forums far distant from the consumer's residence. It is a practice which
received recognition, but little study during the early 1970s. Furthermore,
although the practice, known as "distant forum abuse," has been proscribed by
federal law in certain circumstances and by some states' laws, it continues to
exist within the technical bounds of the law in many jurisdictions.
There are many variations on the practice, but a brief overview of how it
works may be helpful at this point. The initial aspect of distant forum abuse is
the consumer transaction which gives rise to the creditor's alleged cause of action. Ordinarily, this will involve either a consumer's purchase of goods, services, or both, payment for which is arranged on credit terms (e.g., a retail installment sale), or it will involve a consumer loan.' Often the sales will be the
result of a home, telephone or mail solicitation by a company representative of
'CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES. National Commission on Consumer Finance, (1972). Indeed,
this study is still the basis of consumer credit policies being developed currently. See American Financial Services Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1185 (1986).
ID. CAPLOVITZ. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974) (This book is actually a
compilation of the study data. The actual final report is D. CAPLOVITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT, from the
Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University (Vol. 1 1970; Vol. 2 1971).

'See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, Subch. I, Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1667e (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (The Truth-in-Lending Act, effective 1968).
'Though discussed on a peripheral basis, distant forum abuse involving alleged defaults on consumer loan
transactions will not be the major emphasis of this paper.
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the seller.7 These representatives may be from a company which maintains a
central location for business operations, but they travel to all parts of the state
(or in some cases, other states) in order to facilitate business. Whether or not
the goods or services sold are needed by the consumer, the solicitations may result in the signing of a formal contract by the consumer. As one witness who
testified before the NCCF observed "[m]any low-income consumers are deluged by door-to-door salesmen whose sole purpose in selling goods is to get the
consumer to sign a credit agreement." 8 Indeed, low-income neighborhoods can
be specifically targeted by these businesses in order to engage in these transactions.
The next important stage in the development of a distant forum situation
is the signing of the contract. While the consumer probably signs the contract
at her residence, the selling company's agent may not sign the contract until it
has been returned to the home office. This may become important later in
determining where the contract was "made." Where legal under state law, the
contract may contain a clause which designates a specific county as the venue
of consent for both parties should a suit arise from the transaction. In the alternative, there may be a contractual provision which establishes the "understanding" of the parties that the legal "place of performance" of the contract is
in a particular county. This "place of performance" may have no relation to
the actual performance of the contract, and will most likely be the county
where the seller maintains its central office.
A third important variable in the process is the type of business entity
which initiates the legal action upon the alleged default. This is a crucial factor
in determining the applicability of existing distant forum prohibitions and in
evaluating the potential applicability of other statutes which may provide a
remedy for these practices. In many cases, the seller or supplier of goods or services may extend its own credit to the purchasing consumer and collect its own
debts through an "in-house" collector. Another option, often employed by
smaller businesses, is to hire an independent debt collection agency, or "thirdparty" debt collector. These are companies or individuals which engage in the
practice of tracking down and collecting past due accounts from consumerdebtors. The abuses of members of this industry first called to Congress' attention the problems of debt collection activities9 and prompted it to pass the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). ° Another option sellers have is to
hire companies to "service" their accounts. This practice involves turning over
'Such solicitations have presented their own consumer protection problems which have been addressed by
federal and state laws and regulations. See, e.g. Cooling-Off Period For Door-To-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R. §
429 (1986); Home Solicitation Sales Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.21-1345.28 (Page 1979 & Page
Supp. 1985); OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 109:4-3-11 (1977).
'Summary of Hearings on Debt Collection Practices, National Commission on Consumer Finance, 88
BANKING L.J. 291, 319 (1971) (paraphrased testimony of Charles Baron).
'See 123 CONG. REC. 10240-10241 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).

"15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692-1692o (1982 &1987
Supp.
Published
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accounts for regular collection before there is any default on consumer payment. The accounts may be sold or assigned, and the servicing companies may
actually be owned and operated by the same people who own and operate the
seller company. While the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Holder-in-duecourse rule preserves the consumer's right to assert all valid claims and
defenses which could have been asserted against the original seller against any
holder of a consumer credit contract," this protection is meaningless where the
fundamental issue is the consumer's inability to defend in the lawsuit at all.
The final option sellers and other creditors have is the type of court in
which to file their suits. In the past, small claims courts have been a favorite
forum for suing on alleged consumer defaults, provided the amount of
recovery sought was under the jurisdictional maximum. 2 Otherwise, the
business plaintiffs may sue in lower-level county or municipal courts, or in the
highest-level state trial courts (usually labeled "Superior" or "Common Pleas"),
assuming other jurisdictional prerequisites have been met. As will be illustrated below, if the state venue rules for courts at these levels vary, the options may be more limited.
A typical case of distant forum abuse, then, might involve the sale of a set
of encyclopedias to a low-income family. The sale, initiated by a door-to-door
solicitation, is financed by the seller at a high annual percentage rate with a
low initial payment required of the consumer. However, given dire financial
circumstances, or perhaps because of some contract breach by the seller (nondelivery, breach of warranty, etc.), the consumer stops her monthly
payments. 3 The seller, its assignee or other agent, or an independent debt collection agency initiates suit in a county far from the consumer's residence or
from where she signed the contract (usually the same place). Though the consumer receives service of process at her residence, she may have little or no
idea how to file an answer or otherwise respond. Location of this forum may
be a foregone conclusion due to contractual provisions or liberal state venue
laws. Ignorance of valid defenses or fear of commercial ostracization may also
inhibit the consumer from responding. More importantly, at least with respect
to remediable offenses, the tremendous expense, inconvenience and difficulty
of defending a legal action in a distant forum is likely to be prohibitive. Obtain"FTC Holder-In-Due-Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1986).
2
See Note, The Ohio Small Claims Court: An Empirical Study, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 469 (1973); Note, The
Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Court in
California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657 (1969).
"Of course, it is possible that the consumer may simply refuse to pay. However, studies have shown that the
case of the so-called "deadbeat" is extremely rare and that a large majority of defaults by consumers is the
result of unexpected occurrences such as unemployment, emergency medical expenses, overextension and
marital problems. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 4, at 47; S. Rep. No. 95-382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1695, 1697; FTC Credit Practices Rule: Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7747-48 (1984) (rule codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1986));
see also American Financial Services Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 1185 (1986).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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ing the default judgment becomes nothing more than a mere formality for the
business plaintiff where it is probable that the consumer-defendant will not file
a formal answer.
Filing debt collection actions against consumers who may have been
unable to afford the underlying purchase anyway may, at first glance, seem
counterintuitive. But incentives remain for the pursuit of these debts. First,
once a default judgment has been obtained, the creditor may invoke the traditional post-judgment remedies of attachment and wage garnishment. Where
permissible under state law, liens may be placed on certain items of the
consumer-debtor's property followed by the execution of lien sales to satisfy
the judgment. The wage garnishment option will yield continual payments for
very little effort on the part of the seller or debt collector. Regular collection of
these relatively small amounts on a high-volume basis may be financially
desirable. Furthermore, even if the debt ultimately becomes uncollectible after
judgment, there are significant tax advantages to having the claim reduced to
judgment. Bad debt losses are allowed as deductions from taxable income on
federal income taxes for certain business entities.' Although the latter point is
not a concern to the ordinary consumer, it does provide another incentive for
debt collectors to engage in this practice.
While the above examples may seem like outlandish consumer advocate
hyperbole to the uninitiated person, the nature and existence of distant forum
abuse is well-documented. Evidence that the problem is considered to be of national importance was manifested by the enactment of a federal statute prohibiting independent debt collection agencies from bringing legal actions in
places other than where the consumer resides at the time action is initiated, or
where the consumer signed the contract underlying the action." However,
there was little discussion of distant forum abuse in the congressional hearings,
reports or floor debates on the bills which eventually became the FDCPA,
since the primary focus of the act was on more direct methods of harassment
undertaken in the collection of debts.
Earlier hearings held by the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) New
York Regional Office did reveal some of the problems with the existence of distant forum abuse. The staff report produced as a result of these hearings concluded that the practice imposed great hardship on consumer-debtors. 6
The plaintiff, having selected a forum convenient to himself, may have at
the same time imposed a hardship upon the defendant as far as travel and
expenses are concerned. The defendant may have to lose a day's salary
which he can ill afford. In addition, the defendant who has retained a
1-26 U.S.C. § 166 (1982).
'515 U.S.C. § 1692i (1982).
16FTC
Staff Report on Debt Collection Hearings (April, 1973), quoted in In re Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425,
441-43 (1975).
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private attorney, may have to pay additional expenses to have the attorney travel to defend. Or, if the debtor desires to be represented by a
legal services agency, he may find that the local legal services office may
have to refer him to the legal services office in the county of suit because
the local office is not physically equipped to handle the defense properly.
This, in turn, imposes other hardships, it becomes more difficult and more
expensive to prepare a defense. It may be possible for the defendant to
make a motion for a change of venue

. . .

but where the defendant is

without counsel, he would probably be unaware of this, and, in any event,
technicalities of motion practice may make it too difficult for the
consumer-debtor to accomplish on his own. Thus, while the plaintiff may
bring the action in a forum inconvenient for the consumer with respect to
venue, unless the defendant moves for a change of venue, the action may
still proceed there.
Furthermore, the NCCF recommended imposed limits on the forum for
suits against consumers for non-payment. In its report, the NCCF recognized
that, at the time, many states permitted distant forum suits creating high
potential for abuse." It also noted that "[tihe practice usually results in the entry of a default judgment and, in effect deprives the debtor-defendant of a
reasonable opportunity to defend against the underlying claim."' 8 Moreover,
the extent to which this collection tactic may be used can be quite high. One of
the hearings held by the NCCF in order to gather information for its report
revealed at least one report of an attorney who had obtained ten thousand
default judgments in one year by using the distant forum approach.' 9
While no new national studies have been done in recent years, evidence of
continued distant forum abuse exists, though the extent of the problem is difficult to measure. In fact, one of the inherent problems in studying distant
forum cases is the inability to collect complaints from consumers who have
been victimized by debt collectors. Many factors contribute to this situation.
First, and foremost, is that the consumer-debtor is unlikely to know that there
is anything about which to complain. Not only will consumers be ignorant of
the possible defenses to the action and the fact that the choice of forum may be
in violation of some laws, but also they have the related fear stemming from
the fact that it is the consumer-debtor who has defaulted for whatever reason.
This element of complaining without "clean hands" may discourage consumers with valid complaints from exercising their legal rights. Furthermore, it
may blind public officials to the existence of this abusive debt collection practice.
The issue of unreported complaints arose at the House hearings leading to
"NCCF Report, supra note 3, at 41.
'11d. (emphasis added).
9

Collection Practices, National Commission on Consumer Finance, 88
Givens).

" Summary of Hearings on Debt
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
BANKING L.J. 291, 293-94 (1971) (testimony of Richard A.
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the passage of the FDCPA. There, an industry representative of the debt collection agencies attempted to disavow any notion that abusive debt collection
practices in general are hard to discover and often go unreported. 0 He also
testified that attempts to publicize debt collection abuse in order to generate
more complaints had failed to significantly increase the complaint rate."
However, in the same hearings, the Director of the Minnesota Office of Consumer Services testified that people are often reluctant to complain because
their debts are often really owed and they are simply unaware of their rights."
This latter point is even more prevalent in the area of distant forum abuse
since people are more likely to complain of direct harassment or threats than
about the more technical issue of propriety or fairness of "venue."
While not as blatantly offensive as some of the direct harassment methods
employed by unethical debt collectors, the practice of distant forum abuse is
more insidious. It engages an ostensibly legitimate legal process to deprive consumers of basic opportunities which should be afforded all litigants, thus defying basic notions of due process in a very realistic sense. When a consumer,
whether or not she has a valid defense, finds that the cost of hiring legal
counsel, the expenses incurred in traveling to a distant court, the lost income
from work days spent in court or out on other matters related to litigation and
the tremendous inconvenience involved in appearing and defending, greatly
outweigh the amount in controversy, the choice becomes a foregone conclusion. At best it is fundamentally unfair; at worst it is oppressive. Furthermore,
a clear potential exists for harsh injuries to be incurred by consumers who are
victimized by distant forum abuse. Not only can money or property be drawn
off with the post-judgment remedies available to creditors, but also consumer
credit records can be forever ruined. Expenses relating to the defense, if the
consumer by any chance chooses to challenge the collection suit, can be quite
high. Moreover, inequality in bargaining position may produce the ideal
scenario for the creditor or other debt collector who is interested in obtaining
assembly-line default judgments as a regular business practice. Finally, there is
a presumptive element of extreme unfairness to the low-income litigant in this
practice of distant forum abuse. The disproportionate impact upon the poor
points up even more potently the necessity for an effective remedy. It was concern for such consumers that led, in the past decade, to some legal
developments designed to deal with the problems of collection suits filed in distant forums.
11The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the House Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1977)
(statement of John W. Johnson, Executive Vice President, American Collectors Association, Inc.).
21
1d. One example cited by the witness was the fact that nationally-syndicated columnist Jack Anderson's article which lambasted professional collection services for their abusive tactics generated only two-thousand
complaints. It was not, however, explained how widely read Mr. Anderson's column is among the class of
debtors who are most often subject to debt collection abuse.
h1id. at 367-68 (statement of Sherry Chenoweth, Director, Minnesota Office of Consumer Services).
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EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE REMEDIES

Distant forum abuse has not gone unnoticed in the seventeen years that
have passed since the NCCF was commissioned. In fact, federal and state laws
have been enacted to address the problem by various approaches. Nevertheless, an overview of the new development of legal solutions to this unfair
collection practice will quickly illustrate the inadequacy of their scope. A more
effective and far-reaching approach would be to use as a statutory basis
various state consumer protection laws to condemn the practice of distant
forum abuse as an unfair or deceptive act or practice.
Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was one of the first governmental
entities to take any positive action to eliminate the practice of distant forum
abuse. In fact, it was the FTC's "fair venue standards" which Congress
adopted when it enacted the distant forum provision in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). 3 During the past decade, the FTC has brought
several complaints against parties engaged in collecting debts by filing lawsuits
in forums far from the consumer-defendant's residence or from where she signed
the initial contract. These complaints have resulted in consent orders or other
Commission orders which have instructed the defendants to cease and desist
from this "unfair" debt collection practice.24
The FTC complaints were filed under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act25 (FTCA), and asserted that distant forum abuse is an unfair
practice. The respondents were either collection agencies, loan companies or
general retail merchandisers who extended credit to facilitate their sales. The
respondent companies were ordered to cease and desist from filing distant
forum suits. The orders also restricted the respondents' successors, assigns and
agents, including independent debt collection agencies.26 Furthermore, these
orders all required the respondent companies to terminate any existing suits
that were filed in a county other than where the consumer resided at the time
of the suit's commencement or where she signed the contract, or in the alternative, to effect a change to the appropriate forum.27 Respondents also were
ordered to vacate any default judgments obtained after the date of the Com2315 U.S.C. § 1692i (1982); S. REP. No. 95-382, 95th Cong., I st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
At). NEWS 1695, 1699.
"In re Marathon Oil Co., 92 F.T.C. 422 (1978) (consent order); In re S.S. Kresge Co., 90 F.T.C. 222 (1977)
(consent order); In re New Rapids Carpet Center, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 64 (1977); In re Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425
11975), enforcedas modified Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.), modified 88 F.T.C. 1001 (1976);
In re Commercial Service Co., 86 F.T.C. 467 (1975) (consent order); In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 84
F.T.C. 1337 (1974) (consent order); In re West Coast Credit Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1328 (1974) (consent order)
[hereinafter cited collectively as FTC Distant Forum Orders].
2515 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 and Supp. 11 1984).
"FTC Distant Forum Orders, supra note 24.
d.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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mission's order which were not obtained in compliance with that order.2"
Only one of the FTC's distant forum orders was appealed, 9 and that appeal eventually provided the Commission with strong judicial approval for its
actions against distant forum abusers.30 In Spiegel Inc. v. FTC, the FTC had
filed a complaint against a large catalogue retail merchandiser located in
Chicago. The company had a nationwide business and regularly received mailorder purchase requests from consumers in many different states for which
consumer credit was regularly extended." Apparently, consumers executed
either purchase orders or contracts in their home states. 2 However, the Commission complained that Spiegel had made it a practice to consistently file
lawsuits in Cook County, Illinois against consumers who were allegedly in
default without regard to the consumers' place of residence.33 The FTC's complaint argued that this practice was unfair under the FTCA because it effectively deprived out-of-state consumers of a reasonable opportunity to appear,
answer and defend. 4
The Commission's decision in Spiegel affirmed an administrative law
judge's findings and order which declared the company's practice unfair and
halted the further filing of distant forum suits.35 It found that Spiegel's use of
the Illinois long-arm statute, which provided for in personam jurisdiction over
out-of-state parties, fell short of the constitutionally required "minimum contacts" necessary to establish personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state consumers. 6 Furthermore, the FTC found that Spiegel's practice was oppressive
and injurious to consumers. 7 The Commission's decision described Spiegel's
distant forum practice as "patently offensive to clearly articulated public
all citizens a meaningful opportunity to defend
policy, intended to guarantee
38
themselves in court.9
After modifying the Commission's decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the Commission's order. 9 The court
declared that almost all of the out-of-state consumers sued by Spiegel had no
pertinent contact with Illinois, but declined to decide the issue of whether per2

8d

"in re Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425 (1975).
I'Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cit. 1976).
3
in re Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425, 437 (1975).
32

/d.

"d. at 426.
34Id.
'id. at 437-38.
111d. at 441. See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"In re Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425, 441 (1975).
31Id.
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sonal jurisdiction was proper under the Illinois long-arm statute.' ° Instead, the
court held that the FTC had the power to enjoin the company from bringing
distant forum suits against out-of-state consumers regardless of whether
jurisdictional concerns had been satisfied.,' The Commission's implicit finding
that Spiegel's practice was a per se violation of the constitutional right to due
process was rejected by the court, which observed that administrative agencies
are not generally authorized to determine the constitutionality of administrative or legislative actions. 2 However, the Commission's order was enforced since the court agreed that distant forum suits against out-of-state consumers were in violation of the FTCA prohibition against "unfair practices." 3
The Seventh Circuit limited the FTC's order, which proposed to prohibit
Spiegel from filing any collection suit other than where the defendant resides
or where she signed the contract." Noting that the Commission had neglected
to allege or prove that Spiegel was abusing Illinois venue laws, the court held
that "the Commission's order should not be enforced insofar as it relates to Illinois consumers who are sued in a county courthouse which is a reasonable
distance from their place of residence." 5 The FTC modified its order in accordance with the Seventh Circuit's opinion later that year.0
Although the Spiegel decision strongly condemned distant forum abuse,
there are substantial limitations both on the decision and on the FTC's
authority which leave room for further remedial power at the state level. The
first important limitation is with respect to the scope of distant forum abuse as
an "unfair" practice under the FTCA. The appeals court's opinion in Spiegel
did not go so far as to say intrastate distant forum suits are per se unfair. This
was primarily a result of the Commission's failure to raise the issue of abuse of
Illinois venue laws in its complaint or decision. 7 However, the court's opinion
left open the FTC's option to further complain and prove any intrastate distant
forum abuse it may have discovered." Even here, the implication was that intrastate suits would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis. In a footnote, the court explained that "the FTC argues that if the order is not enforced
in toto Spiegel could sue a Cook County resident in Cairo, Illinois, hundreds of
miles away from his residence. In this extreme example, such conduct by
'ld. at 291-92.
"Id. at 292.
'/d. at 294.
4JId.

"Id. at 296.
"4Id.The logic in this restriction is somewhat evasive since it is equally conceivable that an out-of-state consumer from, for example, southern Wisconsin, would actually be closer to Cook County than an Illinois consumer from the state's southernmost part.
In re Spiegel, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 1001 (1976).
"Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 295-96 (7th Cir. 1976).
"Id.at 296-97.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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Spiegel would amount to a violation of Section 5"of the FTCA.4 9 Had the issue
been before it, it is questionable whether the court would have declared all distant forum suits to be unfair.
But even beyond the shortcomings of the Spiegel opinion, there is a
separate limitation on the scope of the FTC's authority to reach all business
operators who employ the distant forum practice. In each of the Commission's
distant forum cases the complaints clearly set forth that the respondent
businesses had operations which extended beyond state lines, 0 even if the collection suits were only within one state.' This criterion is crucial to the FTC's
jurisdictional authority since the FTCA mandates that the Commission's
power is maintained only with respect to unfair acts or practices "in or affecting [interstate] commerce."52 So while it is clear from the Spiegel opinion that
the FTC can monitor intrastate debt collection suits, 3 it is equally clear that
the businesses must be operating in or affecting interstate commerce before the
FTC may take action." This may exclude from the Commission's jurisdiction
any business which consciously operates within only one state. Included in this
category would be many of the smaller, home solicitation sellers described
earlier, as well as a large number of finance companies and debt collection
agencies. Notably, this is precisely the area in which state agencies charged
with enforcement of consumer protection laws can most effectively operate.
Also significant is the limitation on the FTC's resources. Even if all
business entities instituting distant forum suits were within the FTC's jurisdictional reach, it would be impractical for the FTC to file complaints against any
but the most egregious, high volume violators. As it is, the FTC's past complaints and orders in distant forum cases have been against larger companies
engaging in a great deal of distant forum litigation," including one of the
largest retail merchandisers in the country. 6 This would, and most likely does,
leave a significant portion of distant forum plaintiffs free to operate without
the FTC's scrutiny.
Furthermore, the remedies available under the FTCA are inadequate to
compensate for the lack of resources. The FTC does have the power to enjoin
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 7 as well as to recover civil penalties for
4

"Id. at 296 n. 12 (emphasis added).

"FTC Distant Forum Orders, supra note 24.
"See, e.g., In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 84 F.T.C. 1337, 1338 (1974).
5215 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).

"Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1976).
"'Compare the broad, congressionally-authorized FTC enforcement jurisdiction established under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (1982).

"FTC Distant Forum Orders, supra note 24.
61n re Montgomery Ward & Co., 84 F.T.C. 1337 (1974).
§ 45(a) (1982).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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knowing violations of its rules, final orders and cease and desist orders. 8 And
in certain situations, the Commission may bring civil actions for violations of
its rules or cease and desist orders in which a federal district court may, at its
discretion, grant consumer relief such as rescission, refund and damages. 9 But
if the FTC cannot enforce the FTCA because of limited resources, then it will
remain unenforced since there is no right to private action under the FTCA, 6°
and the courts have been unwilling to read one into the Act.6 So the concept of
the "private attorney generals" filling in the gaps where the government is
unable to take action is unavailable to the victims of distant forum abuse under
current federal law.
Finally, the FTC has failed to promulgate a rule specifically prohibiting
distant forum suits, although it has issued other rules regarding debt collection
and credit practices. 62 Moreover, its rulemaking power is somewhat restricted
since the Commission has no authority to promulgate rules under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),63 or with respect to banks and savings
and loan associations, 6 which are also potential collection suit plaintiffs. 5
For these reasons, the FTC and the FTCA do not provide sufficient or
complete coverage of the distant forum practice. Broader coverage with
respect to creditors and other collectors who operate only within one state as
well as provisions for a private cause of action in which damages are
recoverable are necessary elements of an effective program for the elimination
of this unfair practice. Ultimately, it is at the state level that these loopholes
have to be closed.
FairDebt Collection PracticesAct
The first congressional recognition that distant forum abuse represented
an unfair collection practice came in the same year as the Spiegel decision,
when four bills were introduced to regulate the practice of independent debt
115

U.S.C. § 45(l)-(m) (1982).

915 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (1982).
-15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982 & Supp. 111984). An attempt to amend the Act to include a private right of action was defeated in 1977. Originally contained in H.R. 3816, the provision would have allowed private class
action suits to enforce the FTCA. 123 Cong. Rec. 34594 (1977).
"Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6216 C.F.R. § 237 (1986); 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1986).
6115 U.S.C. § 1692(l)(d) (1982).

"15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1982).
"Banks and savings and loan associations are specifically exempted from the FTCA. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(1982). However, the Act orders the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board to promulgate regulations applicable to these financial institutions which are

substantially similar to FTC trade regulation rules. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1982). Although these federal agen-

cies have yet to comply with the statutory order, inclusion of a distant forum prohibition in the ultimately
issued rules would be of great help to consumer-defendants with respect to litigation involving financial in-

stitutions. However, it is not clear to what extent these institutions contribute to the distant forum problem. 12
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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collection agencies.6 6 In the following year, 1977, Congress enacted the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in order "to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors ... and to promote consistent State ac-

tion to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. ' 67 The FDCPA addresses major concerns with the debt collection industry, including restrictions
on communication with the consumer and with third parties in relation to the
alleged debt,6 proscription of harassment 69 and false or misleading representations,7" and prohibition of unfair or unconscionable practices pursued in the
collection of debts." In addition, section 811 of the FDCPA requires that:
(a) Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any
consumer shall -

(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer's obligation, bring such action only in a
judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real property
is located; or
(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring such
action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity (A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or
(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the
action,
(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize bringing of
legal actions by debt collectors.72
Thus the FDCPA embodies what is generally considered to be a fair standard
for debt collection suits on consumer debts, and closely tracks the FTC orders
in its distant forum cases.73
Unfortunately, the persons covered by the FDCPA represent only a small
part of all debt collection plaintiffs in consumer credit suits. The Act applies
only to a narrowly defined class known as "debt collectors."' 4 Basically, this
term, as defined by the FDCPA, encompasses any person whose "principal
purpose" is the collection of any debts, or who "regularly collects or attempts
to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or
due another."" It also includes creditors collecting their own debts by another
-H.R. 11969, H.R. 13720, S. 3652, and S. 3838 were all introduced in the Second Session of the 94th Congress. H.R. 13720 passed the full House, but the 94th Congress came to a close before the Senate could take

action.
"115 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1982).
"15 U.S.C. § 1692c (1982).
915 U.S.C. § 1692d (1982).
1015 U.S.C. § 1692e (1982).
"15 U.S.C. § 1692f (1982).
'215 U.S.C. § 1692i (1982).
'"FTC Distant Forum Orders, supra note 24.
"15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1982).
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name such that would suggest that a third party is collecting the debt.76 Among
those exempted from the term "debt collector" are in-house debt collectors, attorneys-at-law and persons acting as a debt collector for another person where
both are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control."
The reason Congress limited the statutory definition of "debt collector"
was that there seemed to be a strong need to regulate the practices of independent collection agencies, rather than merchandisers and other direct extenders
of credit. The rationale underlying this was explained on the Senate floor by
Senator Biden, who introduced one version of the FDCPA in both 1976 and
1977. He stated that "[t]he independent collectors, by common practice, are
recognized as a separate industry. They have no particular concern for maintaining good customer relations with the debtors they pursue. And, above all,
the independent debt collectors generate a disproportionate number of the
complaints about collection practices."78
While members of Congress felt the need to enact a statute which covered
at least the independent collection agencies, others recognized the limited
scope which this entailed. One of the sponsors of the House version which was
eventually passed remarked that "[tihe provisions of this bill do not apply to a
bank, a financial institution, department stores, a record club or any business
that attempts to collect its own debt. Provisions of the bill only apply to about
1 percent of the debts collected in the country, and maybe that will have to be
expanded a little later on."79 Perhaps if the definition had not been so restrictive, other state remedies might be unnecessary. But as the FDCPA currently
stands, its ameliorative effects are quite limited.
At least with respect to the businesses that the FDCPA does cover, the
Act provides strong and effective remedies. For example, although administrative enforcement of the Act is the responsibility of the FTC,8" consumers who
have been injured by debt collectors in violation of any FDCPA provision may
recover their actual damages, up to one thousand dollars in additional damages
and attorneys' fees.8 ' The Act also authorizes private class action suits to enforce its provisions. 2 Furthermore, the FDCPA applies to any debt collector
who "uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails" in the process of collecting debts. 3 Unlike the FTCA, the FDCPA covers "debt collec76

Id.

771d.
71123 CONG. REC. 31,493 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Biden). Two proposed bills, S.656 and S.918, would have
also held jointly liable those creditors who had knowledge of the debt collector's violation of the debt collec-

tion practices act. Neither version prevailed. 123 Cong. Rec. 6337 (1977).
11122 CONG. REC. 22,502 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Wylie). This statement was made in regard to the original
House bill passed by the 94th Congress, but is equally relevant to the FDCPA as it exists.
"15 U.S.C. § 16921 (1982 & Supp. 111984).
SI15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (1982).
8215 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2) (1982).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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tors" who operate solely within one state, since it is inevitable that debt collectors cannot avoid using the telephone or mail in their businesses. The congressional findings and declaration of purpose state that "[elven where abusive
debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless
directly affect interstate commerce.""' These jurisdictional declarations make it
relatively easy to bring any "debt collector" who violates the FDCPA into
court and seek damages under the Act's provisions.
Though the FTC's powers were slightly expanded by this statute in an indirect manner, the Commission was specifically prohibited from promulgating
rules pursuant to FDCPA provisions. 5 This was probably included to appease
factions of Congress which were concerned that the Act would greatly increase the bureaucracy already in place, and perhaps lead to much more detailed and expansive restrictions on debt collection.8 6 Some members of Congress were concerned that the Act would preempt state policy-makers from
acting independently to regulate debt collection practices. Because of these
concerns, section 817 of the Act was included to provide that the FTC may
grant exemptions from the FDCPA for any class of debt collection practices
within any state if it determines that state law effectively regulates such activity." This was intended to facilitate the expansion of state interest in the regulation of debt collection practices. 8 Yet with only a few exceptions, little has
been done at the state level to deal with the problem of distant forum abuse
since the enactment of the FDCPA.
State Remedies
Ironically, it was the inadequacy of state laws regulating debt collectors
which was one of Congress' primary reasons for enacting the FDCPA. 9 But as
a result of the limited scope of the FDCPA with respect to types of debt collection entities, and the "interstate commerce" jurisdictional prerequisites of the
FTCA, remedies are still necessary at the state level to completely eliminate
distant forum abuse. In Texas, California and Massachusetts, either the
legislature or the court of last resort has spoken out against distant forum suits.
An overview of the prohibitions in these three jurisdictions may provide some
hints regarding effective approaches toward eradicating this unfair practice in
other states.
It is natural that intrastate distant forum abuse was recognized as a prob-15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (1982).
"15 U.S.C. § 16921(d) (1982).
123 Cong. Rec. 10,244 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Wylie).
"15 U.S.C. § 1692o (1982).
"123 CONG. REC. 10,242 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
'Ss. REP. No. 95-382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1695,
1696-97.by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1987
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lem of significance in Texas, which is, by geographical area, the second largest
state in the Union.9" Apparently in response to a persuasive law review
article,9 the Texas legislature addressed the problem of distant forum abuse by
enacting an amendment to the state venue statute.92 This amendment became
section 5(b) of Article 1995 of the Texas Civil Statutes (currently § 15.035(b) of
the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code), and provided that in creditors'
suits upon contractual obligations of a consumer to pay money arising out of a
"consumer transaction" for goods, services, loans, or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural use, the venue
may be either in the county where the consumer resides at the time the suit is
commenced or where the consumer signed the contract. 93 It also prohibited the
inclusion of waiver provisions in these contracts which would destroy the consumer's rights under this subsection.9 '
This provision was necessary because the first part of this statutory section, which was formerly the only part, allowed suits on written contracts
whenever the contract expressly stated the particular county in which the contract was to be "performed" to be brought in that county. 95 Thus, any business
which desired to use a distant forum for its collection suits could invoke this
statutory venue provision merely by using standard form contracts designating
the county of its choice as the place of performance, even if that place had no
significant connection to the transaction underlying the suit. 96 While this provision is still contained in the venue statute, it is now subject to the limitations
imposed by section 15.035(b).
In 1977, however, a Texas state appellate court partially undercut the impact of section 15.035(b) in dictum from its opinion in Vargas v. Allied
Finance Co.97 Vargas involved an appeal from summary judgment entered
against a Texas consumer who had filed a class action suit pursuant to the
'U.S. Bureau of the Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRA(TOF THE UNITED STATES: 1985, 191 (105th ed. 1984).
"Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed Solution, 51 TEX. L. REV. 269
11973).
' 2TEx. CIVIL PRACTKE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. §§ 15.001-15.040 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (formerly TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995).
"TEX. CIVIL PRACTICE& REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 15.035(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986). This subsection states: "In
an action founded on a contractual obligation of the defendant to pay money arising out of or based on a
consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural use, suit by a creditor on or by reason of the obligation may be brought against
the defendant either in the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract or in the county in
which the defendant resides when the action is commenced. No term or statement contained in an obligation described in this section shall constitute a waiver of these provisions." Though the court in Vargas v.
Allied Finance Co., infra note 97, was interpreting the almost identically-worded Section 5(b), for purposes
of consistency, the discussion of this case in the text is in terms of the current numbering.

"Id.
"TEX. CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 15.035(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (formerly § 5(a) of art.
1995).
'Sampson, supra note 91, at 272-73.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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Texas consumer protection statute98 to enjoin Allied Finance Company (AFC)
from bringing distant forum collection suits. Class certification had been
denied, and both the summary judgment and the appeal were treated as if the
case were an individual action. The consumer purchased a television and
stereo set from AFC's assignor and executed a promissory note and retail installment contract to finance the transaction. Both documents contained provisions that they were payable or performable in a specific county different
from that of the consumer's residence and the place of sale. AFC sued the consumer upon allegedly delinquent payments in a Justice Court located in the
contractually-designated county of performance. The consumer's plea of
privilege to have the suit transferred to the county of his residence was denied.
Justice Courts in Texas are governed by a venue statute99 different from
that which controls venue in District and County courts. At the time of the
Vargas case, though the Justice Court venue statute had a provision
equivalent to section 15.035(a), permitting contractually-designated venue, it
did not have a distant forum prohibition such as section 15.035(b).'" The court
ruled that the consumer had no ground for injunctive relief since then Article
2390, the Justice Court venue statute, permitted the suit to be maintained in
the county of designated performance, and therefore the consumer protection
statute could not be interpreted to have manifested legislative intent to repeal
Article 2390 by implication.''
But the court went beyond its initial holding to declare that even after the
enactment of section 15.035(b), the Texas consumer protection statute did not
authorize injunctive relief to a consumer sued in distant District or County
courts.' Arguing that section 15.035(b) constituted only permissive venue
which afforded a consumer the right to have a distant forum suit transferred,
rather than an explicit prohibition of distant forum suits, the court stated that
application of the consumer protection statute to enjoin distant forum suits
"would amount to a material alteration of the Ivenuel statute and would constitute an unauthorized intrusion into the legislative process by the
judiciary."'0 3
Probably in frustration over the judiciary's subversion of the true intent
underlying section 15.035(b),"' the Texas legislature finally enacted an amend"TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The provisions authorizing class action
suits were repealed by Acts 1977, 65th Leg. p. 605, ch.216. §§ 10- 11, effective as of May 23, 1977.
"TEX. CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. §§ 15.081-15.100 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
'In 1977, the Texas legislature amended the Justice Court venue statute to include a distant forum prohibition in consumer contract suits. TEX. CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 15.092(c)-(d) (Vernon Supp.
1986).
1*1Vargas, 545 S.W.2d at 233-34.

"'id.at 234.
"'Compare the Texas legislature's original attempt at stopping distant forum suits in the 1973 amendment to
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ment to its consumer protection statute in 1977 which declared distant forum
suits to be a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice.'05 This provides distant forum suit victims in Texas with various remedial options such as injunctive relief, actual damgaes (plus double damages for that portion of actual
damages not exceeding one thousand dollars), costs and attorneys' fees." Furthermore, the state consumer protection division has broad authority to take
action against any person in violation of the distant forum prohibition.' 7 Even
more appealing is the fact that the Texas' consumer protection statute is not
limited in any way as to the type of debt collectors whose activities fall within
its scope. Thus, the same problems which significantly restrict the federal
FDCPA do not hinder the Texas consumer statute.
The only possible drawback to the Texas legislative scheme involves the
fact that if a consumer-defendant is sued in a distant forum and files a motion
to transfer venue (until recently, known in Texas as a "plea of privilege") to the
county of her residence, the plaintiff can file a controverting affidavit and
force the consumer to come to the county where the suit was filed for a venue
hearing.0 8 At least one commentator has proposed that this seriously limits the
effectiveness of the prohibitions in the venue statutes. °9 However, with the
mandatory venue dictated by the Justice Court venue statute, it would be difficult for a plaintiff to file any type of controverting affidavit sufficient to sustain a hearing. With respect to the district and county courts, the creditorplaintiff might be able to get a hearing, but filing of the suit in a distant forum
would still be actionable under the Texas consumer protection law. It is inexplicable that the legislature failed to make the district and county court consumer venue statute mandatory following the Vargas decision. Despite these
problems, it is probably safe to say that Texas now has the best and most comprehensive protection against distant forum abuse of any state in the
country," and can be a model for other states to follow.
where the contract was signed), TEX. CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 15.035(b) (Vernon Supp.
1986), with its post-Vargas amendment to the Justice Court venue statute (consumer debt collection suits
.'may be brought only"in the county or precinct where defendant resides or signed the contract), TEX. CIVIL
PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 15.092(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).

'°"TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(22) (Vernon Supp. 1986). "(b)... the term 'false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices' includes ... (22) filing suit founded upon a written contractual obligation of and
signed by the defendant to pay money arising out of or based on a consumer transaction for goods, services,
loans, or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural use in any
county other than in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action or in the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract; provided, however, that a violation
of this subsection shall not occur where it is shown by the person filing such suit he neither knew or had reason to know that the county in which such suit was filed was neither the county in which the defendant resides at the commencement of the suit nor the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract; ...
"'*TEx- Bus.& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
0
'1
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
'See TEXAS R. Civ. P. 86-87; Guittard & Tyler, Revision of the Texas Venue Statute: A Reform Long
Overdue, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 563, 566-67 (1980).
"'Dorsaneo, Creditors' Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 SW L.J. 245, 263 n. 159 (1978).
""Texas also has statutes regulating debt collection agencies (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
5069-11.11 (Vernon Supp. 1986)) and the use of retail installment sales (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
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California also has an arsenal of statutory provisions which can be used to
prevent businesses from engaging in distant forum abuse. Furthermore, in
1972, the California Supreme Court reached a decision which provides basic
support for the idea that distant forum suits used in a regular course of
business should be prohibited."' In 1965, the California legislature amended its
statute regulating retail installment sales (the Unruh Act) to include a provision which prohibited distant forum suits on retail installment contracts. "2 The
statute was later amended to include lawsuits on retail installment accounts. "3
These provisions, along with the available statutory remedies under the Unruh
Act, establish a quite effective policy against distant forum suits, since such
suits inevitably arise from a transaction involving some sort of installment payment arrangements as defined by the Act.
The California Code of Civil Procedure also contains provisions which
protect consumers from distant forum suits. Section 395 of the Code,
establishing the proper place of trial for judicial actions, was amended in 1971
and 1972 to prohibit distant forum suits against consumers not already
covered by the Unruh Act." 4 Now buttressing this section is a provision which
requires plaintiffs in such cases to include in their complaints, or in affidavits
accompanying these complaints, facts which verify that the court where the
complaint has been filed is the proper court."' Moreover, the trial court has the
authority to raise sua sponte the impropriety of the forum selected by the
plaintiff and transfer the action to the proper court, unless the defendantconsumer otherwise consents to the forum chosen by the plaintiff." 6 These
provisions protect California consumers from the problem in Texas where consumers may be forced to appear in distant venue hearings.
While California law maintains these strict limitations on distant forum
practices, its consumer protection statutes do not contain a condemnation of
distant forum abuse as "unfair."" 7 In fact, the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
5069-6.01-5069-6.09 (Vernon 1971 & Vernon Supp. 1986)), but neither provides any restriction on distant

forum suits.
1"Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
".CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.10 (West 1985). For original version of bill as enacted in 1965, see Stats. 1965, c.

792, p. 2382,

§ 1.

CIv. CODE § 1802.7 (West 1985).
"'CAL. CIV. PRO CODE § 395(b) (West Supp. 1986). This section provides: "(b) Subject to the power of the
court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, in an action founded upon an obligation of
the defendant for goods, services, loans or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family or
household use, other than an obligation described in Section 1812.10 or Section 2984.4 of the Civil Code, the
county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract, the county in which the defendant resided at the
time the contract was entered into, or the county in which the defendant resides at the commencement of
the action is the proper county for the trial thereof."
'This provision formerly applied only to retail installment transactions subject to the provisions of §
1812. 10 of the Civil Code. However, in 1982 it was extended to include all consumer obligations as defined
in §395 of the Civil Procedure Code. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 396a (West Supp. 1986).
116td.
".CAL.

17000-17
Bus.& PROF. CODE §§ 1987
"'See CAL.
Published
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does not even contain a general prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices."' The Unfair Practices Act has such a general prohibition, but its
remedial provisions are limited to injunctive relief, and in certain situations,
civil penalties." 9 These statutory omissions are, of course, mitigated by the
stern prohibitions of distant forum suits discussed above.
Against this statutory backdrop, a look at the major state court decision
2 may be helpful
in California, Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association,"'
in pulling together the extent of California's distant forum law. This case was a
class suit by consumers who sought to enjoin the distant forum practices of a
large collection agency, and to have set aside as void all judgments obtained by
the agency through distant forum suits in the two years preceding the suit. The
defendant collection agency's demurrer was sustained by the trial court and affirmed by a state court of appeals,' after which the consumers appealed to the
state supreme court. The original consumer action was based on statutory provisions of Civil Code Section 3369 (current version contained in sections
17200-17205 of the California Business & Professions Code'), Civil Code Section 1812.10 and Code of Civil Procedure Sections 395 and 396a.
Because of California's special procedural rules, the court only needed to
base its decision reversing the demurrer on the fact that the agency's activities,
as pled by the consumers, constituted an"unlawful" business practice.'23 The
plaintiff consumers had alleged that the agency was intentionally bringing
suits in improper forums under state law, and that the form complaints used to
file the suits failed to state sufficiently the facts necessary for the trial court to
ascertain the propriety of venue. Rather than declare the distant forum suits to
be an unfair practice, the court avoided the issue by deciding that the pattern
and practice of the agency (i.e., the alleged activities in conjunction with each
other) were enjoinable as an "unlawful business practice" in that they failed to
comply with state venue statutes. 24
Unfortunately for the Barquis plaintiffs, at the time their suit was commenced, section 1812.10 of the Unruh Act only applied to retail installment
CIv. CODE § 1770 (West 1985). This section provides a laundry-list of all practices specifically
declared to be unfair or deceptive by the legislature.
1..CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17204, 17207 (West Supp. 1986).
120Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
21
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 16 Cal. App. 3d 793, 94 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1971), vacated, 7 Cal. 3d
94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
22
' CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17205 (West Supp. 1986).
23
' Barquis, 7 Cal. 3d at 98, 496 P.2d at 820, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
24
1 Id. at 112, 496 P.2d at 830, 101 Cal. Rptr. a 758. "In the instant case,. .. we need not undertake the task
of determining the 'fairness' of defendant's alleged conduct in light of contemporary standards, because insofar as defendant's alleged practice involves the repeated violation of specific venue statutes, the practice is
enjoinable under section 3369 as an 'unlawful . . . business practice,' totally apart from its inherent
'fairness.'"
.. CAL.
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contracts, so the court concluded that this part of the statute was inapplicable
to the "open book accounts" on which the agency was collecting. 2 Thus, the
consumers were denied a private cause of action for damages incurred as a
result of the defendant agency's practices. A further limitation on the case's
precedential value was the court's holding that the venue requirements of section 396a of the Civil Procedure Code were not "jurisdictional" so that the
not render the obtained judgments
agency's violation of these provisions 2did
6
void such that they could be set aside.
There are a few limitations on the extent to which the court's opinion in
Barquis may be helpful in future California distant forum cases. First, since
the context in which the appeal was heard was the review of a demurrer, the
court had to assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint.'27 Thus, all
assertions of intentional behavior for the purpose of obtaining default
judgments were considered. Evidence of this intent may not be present in
many cases, yet a trial court following the Barquis decision might read it narrowly and require an element of intent to be shown before injunctive relief
could be granted. Also, since the court determined the twofold practice of (1)
intentionally filing suits in distant forums and (2) filing form complaints with
insufficient factual allegations in violation of procedural rules, to be an
"unlawful" practice, trial courts might require both elements to be present
before issuing an injunction. However, where a company does file distant
forum suits it is unlikely that it will also file a complaint stating the facts of the
case such that a trial court could determine the case was improperly before it,
so the two practices may indeed occur together more often than not. Nevertheless, a more sweeping decision regarding distant forum suits would have
provided a more solid basis for using California's Unfair Practices Act to enjoin distant forum suits as an unfair practice.
Fortunately, the statutory provisions of California law now govern a wide
range of consumer transactions. Since section 1812. 10 was amended to include
suits on retail installment accounts, most consumer contracts fall within its
proscriptions. Furthermore, the venue rules in sections 395, 296a and 396b
provide additional opportunities for the detection of distant forum suits. Although the statutory scheme for distant forum abuse is not as clear in California as it is in Texas, the former still has a strong approach to the problem.
In a case more recent than Barquis, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
cleared the way for consumers to employ the Massachusetts Consumer Protec2

ld. at 123-24, 496 P.2d at 838-39, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
116d. at 119-22, 496 P.2d at 835-38, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 763-66. For a general critique of this aspect of the

court's opinion, see The Supreme Court of California 197 1-1972, Foreword The State Constitution: A More
Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground (Part IIB, "Purposely Filing Actions in Improper Venue"), 61
L. REV. 334 (1973).

at 820-21, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 748-49.
"'Barquis,
7 Cal. 3d at 99, 496 P.2d
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tion Act (MCPA) 28 to sue debt collecting parties who engage in distant forum
abuse. 29 In Schubach v. HouseholdFinance Corp., the court ruled that an act
or practice which is permitted by state law can nevertheless be an unfair or
deceptive act under the MCPA.'30 Like Barquis, this case was brought by consumers against whom distant forum suits were filed by the defendant. The
consumer-plaintiffs sought to have a distant collection suit against them
dismissed and to recover damages for the additional expenses incurred in
defending the collection suit, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. They also asked
to have a class certified for which both retroactive (vacating default
judgments) and prospective (permanent injunction) relief was requested, but
certification was not ruled upon before the supreme court ruled. The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, after
which defendants appealed.
While Massachusetts has no specific statutes restricting the distant forum
practice as do California and Texas, 3' it does have a broad consumer protection act which authorizes private actions for damages, injunctive relief and
costs and attorneys' fees by consumers who have been injured by "unfair"
practices.'32 The MCPA also references FTC and federal court interpretations
of section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA for aid in construing the meaning of "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices."' 33
In affirming the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, the
supreme court took into account the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant
"has a policy and/or regularpracticeof filing collection actions in inconvenient
fora in Massachusetts with the intent and effect of inconveniencing defendants, precipitating default judgments and/or securing more favorable
judgments .... ", 3 Because of liberal Massachusetts venue rules in effect at the
time, the creditors were able to bring collection suits in Boston Municipal
Court notwithstanding the lack of any connection between Boston and the
consumers sued.' 35 The defendant's only argument on appeal was that an act
ANN. LAWS ch. 93A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1985 & Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1986).
' Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 375 Mass. 133, 376 N.E.2d 140 (1978).
10id. at 137, 376 N.E.2d at 142.
"'None of the Massachusetts consumer statutes or procedural rules specifically addresses the distant forum
problem. Though the state has laws on retail installment sales (MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 255D, §§ 1-32
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1980 & Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1986)), and debt collection practices (MASS. ANN.
LAWS, ch. 93, §§ 24-28 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1985 & Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1986)), neither prohibits distant forum abuse.
'MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 93A, § 9 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1985).
'MASS.
29

§ 2(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1985).
"Schubach, 375 Mass. at 134, 376 N.E.2d at 141 (citing plaintiffs' complaint) (emphasis added).
"See MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 223, §§ 1-15 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974 & Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). Section I of this statute was amended in 1985 to place certain restrictions on venue where the "instrument of
the crime" is a negotiable instrument. MASS. ANN. LAWSch. 223, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). This
amendment also limits assignees of negotiable instruments to those venues where the assignor-creditor could
have brought the suit. Id. Actions in Massachusetts small claims courts must be brought in the judicial
district where the defendant lives or has her usual place of business or employment. DISTRICT/MUNICIPAL
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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which is permitted by state law cannot be "unfair" under the MCPA.36 Once
the court disposed of the defendant's argument, it did not need to speak further, and it declined to make a ruling of law which would declare distant forum
suits "unfair" per se.' 3'
Despite the limited nature of this holding, it is clear that the court felt that
this practice very well could be considered unfair upon a full examination and
proof of the facts. This case was an important breakthrough for Massachusetts
consumers, and it has the potential to deter any debt collector from taking advantage of the loosely constructed state venue laws. The Massachusetts courts
have also been willing to read a wide scope of business entities to be within the
MCPA's purview. For example, a few years after the Schubach case, the
Massachusetts high court held that banks and other financial institutions are
engaged "intrade or commerce" such that their activities are subject to the
stringent controls imposed by the MCPA.'38 This sets the stage for the MCPA
to be invoked against any party which attempts to collect allegedly overdue
debts through lawsuits in distant forums.
Texas, California and Massachusetts provide examples for other states on
different approaches to regulating distant forum practice. Texas provides
direct protection through its venue laws and its consumer protection statute, as
well as authorizing private damage actions for injured consumers. California
has similarly restrictive statutes, and, through the Unruh Act, provides a
statutory basis for recovery of damages. And in Massachusetts, the openended law prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" has, through
judicial interpretation, been endorsed as a possible vehicle for retaliation
against collectors who file distant forum suits.
THE PROBLEM OF CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS

The legal fiction of equality of bargaining position in contractual relationships has become an anachronism in the modern era of strong consumer protection remedies. It is for this reason that a brief digression into the validity of
certain contractual waivers will be undertaken here. For if finely-printed terms
on form contracts can divest consumers of their otherwise valid rights, these
provisions may, too, have to be addressed by policy-makers interested in ending the distant forum practice. The statutory remedies being discussed herein
would be meaningless if they could be abrogated by astute business operators
and freely waived by unsuspecting consumers.
The first, and most restrictive, of these contractual terms is the cognovit
ObSchuoach, 375 Mass. at 135, 376 N.E.2d at 141.
""'We do not express a view whether, on all the circumstances which may be disclosed at trial, HFC's commencing its collection action against the plaintiffs in Suffolk County, rather than in Hampden County. constituted an unfair act or practice under G.L. c. 93A, § 2(a)." Id. at 137-38, 376 N.E.2d at 142.
"'Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 384 Mass. 310, 424 N.E.2d 515 (1981).
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note, which authorizes creditor attorneys to confess judgment against the
maker (consumer). The note is contained within the obligation upon which
judgment is taken, and the creditor's attorney need only appear in a court of
competent jurisdiction (venue being irrelevant) and enter judgment against the
debtor without first notifying or serving the debtor.'39 The cognovit note has
long been banned in many states, yet in others it remains a statutorilyauthorized means of obtaining judgments. 40 Fortunately, even in these states
there have been recent statutory amendments or court decisions limiting the
extent to which cognovit notes may be used in contracts underlying consumer
transactions.'' The new FTC Credit Practices Rule, which became effective
on March 1, 1985, bans the cognovit or confession of judgment clause in connection with consumer transactions in or affecting interstate commerce.' 2 Furthermore, in the major United States Supreme Court decision regarding
cognovits, the Court made implicit references to the potential unfairness and
unconstitutional imposition on due process where such notes are used in
"adhesion contracts."' 43 It seems that, at least with respect to consumer transactions, the cognovit is nearing its common law death, and rightfully so.
Still other means exist by which creditors and debt collectors can take advantage of consumer ignorance and circumvent the legal restrictions on the appropriate forum for collection suits. First, the contracts used by retail sellers
and other extenders of credit may, in some states, contain clauses which
manifest the consumer's consent to be sued in a particular venue, which in
many cases has no other connection to the transaction. These "venue waiver"
clauses, if permitted, may to a certain extent allow creditors and collectors to
maintain suits in courts far from the consumer's residence regardless of any
statutory prohibitions. Professor Sampson aptly described the problem with
these often unnoticed clauses.
In making the purchase or loan, the consumers may try to bargain to a
limited extent about the price or the terms of payment. Rarely, however,
do the parties discuss any other aspect of the transaction. The consumers
routinely sign a printed contract or note, ignoring the fine print or failing
to understand its legal implications. If they are bold enough to question
the language in the contract or to attempt to bargain, they soon discover
that the fine print terms are fixed and that the creditor will not negotiate.
Except for the purchase price and repayment terms, a form contract is ofOvermyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 176 (1972); FTC Credit Practices Rule: Statement of
Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7748 (1984) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444
(1986)).
,-See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.12 (Page 1981).
"'See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Page 198 1) (prohibiting use of warrants of attorney to confess
judgment in claims arising out of consumer transactions).

"'1D.H.

"IFTC Credit PracticesRule, 16 CFR. § 444 (1986).
1'4D.H. Overmyer Co., 405 U.S. at 188.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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fered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.'"
In the alternative, the contract may designate a particular county or judicial
district as the formal "place of performance" of the contract as in Vargas v.
Allied Finance Co. ,5 Since most venue statutes would permit a contract suit to
be brought where the contract was to be performed,'46 this type of clause has
the same effect as if there had been a venue waiver.
Recognizing the potential unfairness of such clauses in consumer contracts some courts have been unwilling to enforce these provisions. Traditionally, one of the distinctions between jurisdiction and venue has been the
issue of waiver. Jurisdiction, in the fundamental sense, is an absolute prerequisite to valid judgment, and any judgment entered by a court without proper
jurisdiction is void ab initio.' 47 Venue, on the other hand, is in most cases
waivable, and a failure to object to improper venue, or to move for change of
venue, may be considered a general waiver.'4 However, there may be a distinction between waiver at the time of suit and waiver predesignated by contractual "agreement." The latter will be treated with more scrutiny because of the
inherent potential for abuse of such clauses.
As with cognovits, the problem of contractual venue waiver provisions
has been addressed by some legislative limitations. States which have adopted
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code have specific prohibitions of clauses fixing
venue in consumer credit contracts.'49 The California Code of Civil Procedure
contains a provision which allows a suit to be brought in the contractuallydesignated place of performance, except in those cases involving contracts for
consumer transactions.'5 ° Furthermore, any waiver of the venue provision contained in section 395(b) of the Code is void and unenforceable. 5 ' Additionally,
under California law, section 1812.10 of the Unruh Act' which designates the
proper forum for suits on retail installment sales and accounts has been
declared to be jurisdictional.5 3 This is an important point since it thereby permits collateral attacks on judgments obtained in violation of the Unruh Act.
In Texas, there are restrictions on designating the place of performance in
'"Sampson, supra note 91, at 269.
'Supra note 97.

'"See, e.g., OHIO R. Civ. P. 3.
"'Barquis, 7 Cal. 3d at 114, 496 P.2d at 831, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
"Id. at 114, 496 P.2d at 831, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 759. There will be certain circumstances where venue will
rise to the level of jurisdiction, as in lower-level state courts where venue may be commensurate with territorial jurisdiction.
"'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CREDIT CODE,

7A U.L.A. § 1.201(8)(d) (West 1985).

"'CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 395(a) (West Supp. 1986).
"'CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 395(d) (West Supp. 1986).
"'CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.10 (West 1985).
"'51 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 179 (1968).
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consumer contracts comporting with those in the California procedure rules.
Though the Texas venue statute provides that suits may be brought in the
contractually-designated place of performance, the provision is limited to nonconsumer transactions. 5 " The Texas Supreme Court has held the fixing of
except in the narrowly-prescribed instances authorvenue by contract invalid
55
statute.
ized by that
It is important for state policy-makers to be wary of these contractual
waivers when attempting to create remedies for distant forum abuse. Otherwise, strong legislation restricting distant forum suits may become useless and
legislative intent will have been circumvented.
THE OHIO CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT

Finally, it will be helpful to examine the law on distant forum abuse in a
state with less developed law in this area. Ohio is a particularly interesting state
in which to explore potential remedies for distant forum abuse for several
reasons. First, Ohio venue rules'56 are broad enough to permit collection suits
in counties other than where the defendant resides or does business if the cause
of action has even a minimal connection with the forum county. Second, Ohio
is one of the few states which has no statute whatsoever purporting to regulate
debt collection practices. Third, Ohio's Consumer Sales Practices Act
(CSPA),5 7 which declares unlawful any unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
presents some difficult issues of statutory interpretation which put into question the applicability of the statute to distant forum suits and their
perpetrators. Finally, a state court of appeals in Ohio recently ruled that distant forum abuse is an "unfair" practice under state consumer protection
laws. ' 8 The importance and impact of this decision will be assessed, as will its
implications for the future.
Ohio adopted, with minor revisions, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act "9 in 1972. The CSPA's basic provisions set forth that "[no supplier
shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unfair or deceptive act or practice by a supplier
violates this section whether it occurs before, during or after the
transaction."' A list of specific acts or practices which are statutorilydesignated as "unfair or deceptive" is included in the statute, but this does not
limit in any way the judicial declaration of non-specified acts as unfair or
"'TEX. CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 15.035(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
"'Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1972).
"0OHIO R. Civ. P. 3.
..'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-1345.13 (Page 1979 & Page Supp. 1985).
"'Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 49, 482 N.E.2d 1260 (1984).
1597A U.L.A. §§ 1-19 (West 1985).
60

' OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (Page 1979).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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deceptive.' 6 ' The CSPA similarly prohibits "unconscionable" acts or practices
committed by suppliers in connection with consumer transactions. 6 The state
attorney general has enforcement power,' 63 as well as the authority to promulgate rules which further define "with reasonable specificity" acts or practices
which are unfair, deceptive or unconscionable. 64 Moreover, consumers have a
private cause of action under the CSPA and may obtain injunctive relief, have
and in some situations,
the transaction rescinded, recover actual damages,
6
recover treble damages, attorneys' fees and costs. 1
All of Ohio's statutory law regarding venue is contained in Rule 3 of the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, no matter which type of trial court is involved.
For the purposes of this discussion, there are four important subsections to the
venue rule. Civil Rule 3(B) states in pertinent part:
Proper venue lies in any one or more of the following counties:
(1) The county in which the defendant resides...
(3) A county in which the defendant conducted activity which gave rise
to the claim for relief...
(6) The county in which all or part of the claim for relief arose...
(10) If there is no available forum in subsection (1) through (9) of this subdivision, in the county in which plaintiff resides, has his principal
place of business or regularly and systematically conducts business
activity .... I"
The Staff Notes which accompanied the rule when it was enacted make it
clear that subsection 10 may only be invoked where none of the first nine
forums is available.6 7 However, even without that provision the venue rule is
clearly broad enough to sustain the propriety of a distant forum suit brought in
an Ohio court against an Ohio consumer. If payments are sent to the county
where the creditor or debt collector has its home office it might be construed
that any breach by the consumer's non-payment occurs at the place where
those payments are to be sent. Furthermore, if the county in which the
creditor or collector has its home office has been designated by a contractual
clause as the "place of performance" of the contract, the consumer-debtor may
be held to have "conducted activity" there, or "part of the claim for relief" may
have arisen there. Ohio has no restrictions on contractually-designated "place
of performance" clauses as do several other states, so the business entities may
include these terms in standard form contracts.
'6'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B) (Page 1979).
"O1HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (Page 1979).
",OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07 (Page Supp. 1985).
'"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B) (Page Supp. 1985).
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 (Page 1979).
H111o
'"OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(B) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the alternative locations of proper venue which precede
subsection 10 are not ranked in any order of preference, and it has been held
that where more than one of the "proper" forums is available, the plaintiff may
bring suit in whichever county she chooses.'68 The case which declared this,
GeneralMotors Acceptance Corp. v. Jacks, is especially relevant in that it embodied many elements of distant forum abuse. Jacks involved a motion for
change of venue by a consumer-defendant who was being sued for a deficiency
judgment in a distant county. The consumer had purchased an automobile
from the plaintiff's assignor, which operated its business in the county of the
consumer-defendant's residence. The retail installment contract which was
entered into was assigned to the plaintiff, which maintained its office in a different county. When the consumer allegedly defaulted, the vehicle was
repossessed and the lawsuit was filed in the county where the plaintiff maintained its main office. Though the consumer-defendant's only connection with
the forum was that he sent payments there, the court, in denying the motion
for change of venue, ruled that the defendant had "conducted activity" in the
forum county and that the cause of action arose in the forum county.'69

However, in Ross Orthopedic Supply v. Jewish Hospital,70 another
municipal court ruled differently in a case with facts similar to Jacks. There, a
contract for the purchase of hospital supplies was sued upon by the supplier
when the purchasing hospital refused to pay because of a dispute in the
amount billed. The supplier was located in a distant county and had solicited
the hospital's business at the county where the hospital was situated. The
hospital's only connection with the supplier's county, where the suit was filed,
was a phone call to that county placing a purchase order, a letter sent to that
county to confirm the order and an agreement that payment was to be made in
that county (payment was never made). The court ruled in favor of the
hospital's motion for change of venue on the ground that the hospital's "activities" in the forum county were not substantial or close, as contemplated by
Civil Rule 3 and the accompanying Staff Note.' Thus, it was inappropriate to
invoke Civil Rule 3(B)(3) and 3(B)(6) under these circumstances.
Neither Jacks nor Ross Orthopedic are controlling decisions for the Ohio
courts, yet they illustrate how loosely or strictly Civil Rule 3 may be read. Additionally, Jacks may foreshadow the validity of future distant forum suits, at
least with respect to Ohio venue laws. Also of concern is the fact that Ohio
courts have yet to rule on the validity of contractual provisions which fix
venue in a particular forum or designate a legal "place of performance." It is
clear, however, that venue is waivable once a suit has been filed.'72 Currently in
'"General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jacks, 27 Ohio Misc. 115, 268 N.E.2d 833 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1971).
" ld at 119-20, 268 N.E.2d at 836.
17059

Ohio Misc. 5, 391 N.E.2d 752 (Bellefontaine Mun. Ct. 1977).

11id. at 9, 391 N.E.2d at 754.
'Burnett v. New York Central R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 429 (1965) (recognizing that under Ohio law, venue
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
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Ohio there are no statutory restrictions on these contractual clauses of dubious
fairness.
Those seeking to eliminate distant forum abuse in Ohio may fare better by
looking to the CSPA for remedial provisions. This was the position of the Ohio
Attorney General, who brought suit against distant forum abusers in a recent
case, Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc. " In United Research, a state appellate court held that both a retailer and its affiliate debt "servicing" company
were suppliers under the CSPA, and that their practice of suing consumers,
who had been solicited at their homes, in distant forums on allegedly defaulted
accounts was an unfair act or practice under the CSPA.'74 These holdings, if
followed by other Ohio courts, represent an important breakthrough in Ohio
consumer law, and may provide the basis for many more suits striking down
this abusive practice.
There were two defendants in the attorney general's suit. The defendant
United Research, Inc. (hereinafter "United"), was a company which regularly
sold "educational materials" such as encyclopedias, cookbooks and children's
books throughout the state of Ohio, as well as in many other states. 7 United's
co-defendant was its affiliate credit bureau and collection agency, Universal
Acceptance Corp. (hereinafter "Universal"). Although the sales agreements used
by United did not contain contractual venue waiver or "place of performance"
clauses, other aspects of the sales relationship between United and its
customers were manipulated such that connections were established with
Akron, Ohio, the location of United's central office. Once sales agreements
were signed by consumers, they were sent to United's central office in Akron,
where the company reviewed them and performed credit checks. According to
the defendants, a United representative would then call the consumers 76to
verify interest in the purchase and then "execute" the contract in Akron.
United handled its litigation on overdue debts in two different manners.
On some accounts, United would maintain the collection itself, and, after
other collection attempts had been completed, United would sue the consumers in the Akron Municipal Court. However, other accounts were assigned
to Universal soon after the contracts were executed and prior to the date of the
first installment payment. " The servicing of and collection on these accounts
was Universal's sole function; it did not engage in sales or solicitation of sales
to consumers. Universal would also sue consumers in Akron Municipal Court
when necessary to collect on its accounts.
"'United

Research, 19 Ohio App. 3d 49, 482 N.E.2d 1260.

174Id.

"lid.at 49, 482 N.E.2d at 1261. It was United's practice to hire independent contractors to solicit sales, often
through home solicitations.
"'Brief for Defendant-Appellants at 5, United Research, 19 Ohio App. 3rd 49, 482 N.E.2d 1260.
7'United
and Universal were under common ownership and controlled by the same individual.
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The attorney general sued the defendants to enjoin them from filing distant forum suits against Ohio consumers (as well as out-of-state residents) and
to recover damages under the CSPA.7 8 Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment on liability and damages. The attorney general was granted summary judgment on liability and the common pleas court permanently enjoined
the defendants from suing consumers in distant forums, "9 but the claim for
damages was denied. The attorney general's summary judgment motion was
granted on the basis of affidavits and the defendants' answers to interrogatories, admissions of fact and production of documents. These indicated
that fifty-eight consumers had been sued by the defendants in Akron
Municipal Court of which forty-seven (81 percent) had default judgments
entered against them. These consumers lived as far away as South Carolina,
and within Ohio, as far as Cincinnati. 8°
The primary issues on appeal were whether distant forum suits are unfair
or deceptive practices under the CSPA and whether Universal was a
"supplier," as defined in the CSPA, and thus liable under the Act's
provisions."' The appeals court ruled both that the suits were an unfair practice under the CSPA and that Universal was a supplier under the Act. In doing
so, it relied upon the fact that the FTC and at least one federal court have
declared "a supplier's act or practice of filing collection suits in a judicial
district other than the district in which the consumer resides or signed the contract" unfair and deceptive in violation of the FTCA. s2 These determinations
are given "great weight" in construing the CSPA."3 The court also looked to
the common pleas court in Santiago v. S.S. Kresge Co.,' which had declared
distant forum suits as a regular practice to be unconscionable, and, by similar
reasoning, declared the practice unfair as well." 5
The CSPA, as enacted in Ohio, is illustrative of some of the general problems involving statutory construction of state consumer protection acts with
regard to the question of whether distant forum abusers are subject to
coverage. It is for this reason that a detailed analysis of the operative terms of
the CSPA, as well as their relation to analogous statutes, is necessary. United
Research is the first major case to be decided in Ohio courts on the CSPA's apallegations under the following statutes were also charged: Home Solicitation Sales Act, OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.21-1345.28 (Page 1979 & Page Supp. 1985); Retail Installment Sales Act, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.01-1317.16, 1317.99 (Page 1979 & Page Supp. 1985); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692o (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
"' United Research, 19 Ohio App. 3rd at 49-50, 482 N.E.2d at 1261. The defendants prevailed on the issue of
damages, and the attorney general did not file a cross-appeal on that issue.
'8 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, United Research, 19 Ohio App. 3rd 49, 482 N.E.2d 1260.
"'Related

' United Research, 19 Ohio App. 3rd at 50, 482 N.E.2d at 1261.
2
1d. at 50, 482 N.E.2d at 1262.
3
s OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page 1979).
1"2 Ohio Op. 3d 54 (1976).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
'United Research, 19 Ohio App. 3rd at 50-51, 482 N.E.2d at 1262.
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plicability to distant forum abuse. Its effect on the future of this practice in
Ohio remains to be seen, yet it has already clarified some of the issues regarding the Act.
"Suppliers"and "Consumer Transactions"
Two important issues under the CSPA are (1) whether the business entity
against which the Act is to be invoked is a "supplier" within the meaning of the
Act, and (2) whether the supplier was acting in connection with a "consumer
transaction." If the business entity is not a "supplier" or if it is a supplier and it
has not engaged in a consumer transaction, then no cause of action may be
maintained under the CSPA. As defined by the CSPA, a supplier is "a seller,
lessor, assignor, franchisor, or other person engaged in the business of effecting
or soliciting consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the
consumer."' 86 "Consumer Transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award
by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, franchise, or an intangible, except those transactions between persons, defined by sections
4905.03 and 5725.01 of the Revised Code, and their customers, between attorneys, physicians or dentists and their clients or patients that pertain to
medical treatment but not ancillary services, to an individual for purposes that
are primarily personal, family, or household, or solicitation to supply any of
these things." 7
The first major loophole with respect to distant forum abuse coverage is
the specific exemption from the definition of "consumer transaction" which
provides that persons defined in section 5725.01 of the Revised Code and their
customers do not engage in consumer transactions. Section 5725.01 of the
Ohio Revised Code defines the terms "financial institution" and "dealer in intangibles."'88 Thus, banks and savings and loan institutions are clearly exempt
from the CSPA's coverage. As holders of notes and other assigned evidences of
indebtedness, these institutions would be potential distant forum plaintiffs.
However, there is no empirical evidence indicating that they are the primary
offenders in this field. Of even greater concern is whether certain finance companies would be exempt as "dealers in intangibles." This term includes:
every person who keeps an office or other place of business in this state
and engages at such office or other place in the business of lending money,
or discounting, buying, or selling bills of exchange, drafts, acceptances,
notes, mortgages, or other evidences of indebtedness, or of buying or selling bonds, stocks or other investment securities ....
'"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(C) (Page Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).

(Page Supp. 1985).
01o REV. CODE ANN. § 5725.01 (Page 1980). It also defines "Insurance company," "Domestic Insurance
company" and "foreign insurance company." Section 4905.03 defines different classes of public utilities,
and, through the CSPA provision, transactions between public utilities and their customers are exempted.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5725.01(B) (Page 1980).
.. OH1O REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A)
88
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The question may have to be determined on a case-by-case basis by studying
the activities of the particular company involved. However, any attempt by a
finance company to exempt itself from the CSPA would have to include proof
that it engaged in the activities listed in section 5725.01. Certainly, at least
with respect to consumer loan transactions, it seems that distant forum abuse
is not an action which could be -reached by the CSPA.
However, a wide scope of business entities such as retail merchants, collection agencies, and companies which "service" debts, are still likely to be
restricted by the CSPA from filing distant forum suits provided they meet the
definition of "supplier." Clearly, retail merchandisers are "effecting or
soliciting consumer transactions" on a regular basis, and there is no real
dispute over that issue. Debt collection agencies and variations on finance
companies are closer to the borderline; nevertheless, they should all logically
fall within the statutory definition of "supplier."
Debt collection agencies were held to be suppliers in one of the few
1 The
reported cases on this issue under Ohio law, Liggins v. The May Co. 90
of
victims
been
the
case was a private class action suit by consumers who had
various debt collection abuses. The defendants were a major retail merchandiser and the collection agency to which the retailer assigned its debts. The
defendant-collection agency filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
basis that it was not involved in "effecting" a consumer transaction and that
debt collection itself does not constitute a "consumer transaction." A common
pleas court rejected these claims and overruled the defendant's motion. In doing so, the court interpreted the legislative intent behind the CSPA to be "to
prohibit certain types of consumer practices to apply from the initial contact
between the supplier and the consumer until the relationship terminates...
that relationship continues from the initial inception between consumer and
supplier until, as in this case, the debt is fully paid."'' The court went on to say
that the assignment of debts by the retailer to the collection agency was a part
of the consumer transaction and that "any conduct in violation of the practices
prohibited in the provisions of the Code is not permissible either by the supplier
or its designated assignee, agent or agency with relation to the collection of the
debt ....

"I9

It concluded that independent debt collectors were effecting con-

sumer transactions, and thus fell into the "supplier" definition of the CSPA.
The language of Liggins offers strong support for actions against debt collection agencies, but it does not really clarify precisely what the term "effecting" envisions. Likewise, the court in United Research was not helpful in
elaborating on this point. In its second holding, the court declared that Universal, the retailer's affiliate credit bureau, was a supplier under the CSPA. The
'"44 Ohio Misc. 81, 337 N.E.2d 816 (1975).
'"Id.at 83, 337 N.E.2d at 818 (1975).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2
191Id.

32

Chen: Due Process as Consumer Protection
Summer, 19861

DUE PROCESS As CONSUMER PROTECTION

court read broadly the CSPA's definition of supplier, invoking its belief that
the Act's protections were effective until the debt is paid. 9 Paralleling the
reasoning in Liggins, the court emphasized that allowing the original seller to
avoid the responsibility to conduct business fairly simply by assigning its accounts to an affiliated agent or assignee engaged in unfair practices would be
to defeat the purpose of the CSPA. Without further discussion, it declared that
Universal was "engaged in the business of effecting consumer transactions
(i.e., payment) and, as such, is a supplier pursuant to R.C. 1345.01(C)."'"I This
lends great credibility to the argument that the "effecting" language should be
read quite broadly to include all types of debt collecting entities.
It is the opinion of at least one member of the Consumer Protection Division staff in the Ohio Attorney General's Office, that the Ohio legislature really intended to include the word "affecting" in the supplier definition. If this
were true, it would imply that the legislature intended an even larger scope of
business entities to be covered by the CSPA than are covered now. But even
the term "effecting" lends itself to an interpretation that goes beyond that of
simply completing the sales transaction. "Effect" has been defined as "1. to
cause to come into being ... 2a: to bring about . . . ACCOMPLISH, EXECUTE. . . ."I" Thus, the term can be read broadly enough to entail all types
of consumer purchase financing, debt servicing or debt collection, since all of
these activities may be necessary to actually "accomplish" or "bring about" the
completed sale, lease or other transaction.
There is a possibility that the Ohio legislature had a more restrictive
meaning of "supplier" in mind when it enacted the CSPA. This is evidenced by
the fact that while most of the terms from the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act were adopted verbatim by the Ohio lawmakers, the term "supplier"
was one term which was revised. As defined in the Uniform CSPA, the term
"supplier" meant "a seller, lessor, assignor, or other person who regularly
solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals
directly with the consumer."' 96 The plain meaning of "enforces" as used in the
context of a consumer transaction must refer to the collection of payments
from the consumer.'97 While the terms, "solicit" and "engage" were carried
over, in slightly different form, into the Ohio CPSA, the word "enforce" was
deleted. Although this could be a manifestation of legislative intent to exclude
"'United Research. 19 Ohio App. 3rd at 51, 482 N.E.2d at 1262.
4

11 Id

'"WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 41976).

" Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. § 245) (West 1985). The Commissioner's Comment to
this section elaborates on the definition as follows: "In addition to manufacturers, wholesalers, and dealers,
debt cullection agencies and advertising agencies fall within this definition."
"'it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Kansas recently held that independent debt collection agencies are "suppliers" under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act, which closely follows the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act definition of "supplier." See State ex rel. Miller v. Midwest Serv. Bureau, 229 Kan.
322, 623 P.2d 1343 (1981).
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debt collectors and others who participate in collection activity from the
reaches of the Ohio act, it also could have been a meaningless rearrangement
of terms. The Ohio legislature may have been looking for a more concise way
to express the meaning of supplier, and felt that "effecting a consumer transaction" included within its scope the enforcement of consumer payments. Furthermore, the legislature clearly exempted other distinct entities from the
scope of the Act, and had it intended to exclude debt collection agencies it
could have done so with equal clarity.
The problem regarding what business entities are covered under state consumer protection statutes has often come up in the context of attempts to take
action against debt collection agencies and others engaged in the collection of
debts.' Yet, it is important that these parties be restricted by the provisions of
state consumer laws since the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is so
limited in terms of the business it regulates. The problem with the precision
with which the term "debt collector" was defined by the FDCPA, 919 is that it is
easy to escape the FDCPA's terms by setting up debt collection entities which
are exempted from the FDCPA. For example, rather than accept accounts
which are already in default, a finance company can "service" accounts by
having them assigned by the retailer before the accounts are overdue. In this
way the finance company becomes the "creditor" and collects in its own name,
thus taking it out of the category of businesses regulated by the FDCPA.2°
This is precisely how Universal operated in the United Research case. For
these reasons, it is important that courts take into serious consideration any
sections of state consumer protection statutes which instruct the courts to
liberally construe their provisions in order to fulfill the remedial purpose of
such legislation.2 '
Acts Permitted By Law
Because of the open-ended nature of the Ohio venue rule, the possibility
of distant forum suits exists under Ohio law. This may arguably present
another problem in trying to reach persons bringing distant forum collection
suits with the CSPA. Section 1345.12 of the CSPA provides certain exemptions to the application of the Act, including an exemption for: "An act or
practice required or specifically permitted by or under federal law, or by or
under other sections of the Revised Code, except as provided in division (B)of
section 1345.1 (B) limits the
section 1345.11 of the Revised Code; ....101
"'See, e.g., State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977). This decision
was recently superseded by an amendment to North Carolina's consumer protection statute which put debt
collectors within the scope of the act, as well as barred distant forum suits. See N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 75-1.1,
75.55(4) (1985).
"'15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1982).
'wKizer v. Finance America Credit Corp., 454 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
""1See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
"'"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.12(A) (Page 1979) (emphasis added).
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remedial provisions of the CSPA where a supplier shows that the act or practice complained of has been specifically permitted by FTC orders, rules or
guides or federal court interpretations of Section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA, and that
it has not otherwise been declared unfair, deceptive or unconscionable by an
03
Ohio substantive rule.
Distant forum abuse is certainly not "required" by any federal or state
law, but suppliers may argue that it is "specifically permitted" by Ohio's venue
rule which permits suits where all or part of the cause of action arose, or where
the defendant (consumer) conducted activity which gave rise to the action.2 °
However, this argument should not be received positively by the Ohio courts.
The language of section 1345.12(A) seems to contemplate more of a direct
statutory approval or endorsement of the specific act or practice before the exemption arises. It is clearly a different thing to say that an act is not in violation of any specific state statutory provision than to say it is "specifically permitted" by law . 20S Another aspect of reading this CSPA exemption is how narrowly or broadly the act that is "permitted" is defined. While it may be
"specifically permitted" to drive an automobile at fifty-five miles per hour on
the freeway, that permission would be somewhat tainted if the driver were
escaping from the scene of a crime she had just committed. In the same sense,
it might be "specifically permitted" by the Ohio venue rules to file suit in a
county where part of the claim for relief arose, but the authors of that rule did
not contemplate that they would be specifically allowing distant forum suits
whereby consumers were being effectively deprived of their fundamental right
to appear and defend and where the plaintiffs were engaging in a high-volume
default judgment collection process.
If courts were to follow the supplier argument and uphold distant forum
suits as acts permitted by law, perhaps a legislative amendment to more properly define the exemption would be necessary. Alternatively, the exemption
could be deleted altogether. Although no Ohio cases, including United
Research, have dealt with this issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled
that acts permitted by law are not exempt from being declared unfair and
deceptive in the Schubach case, even though the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act did not, and still does not, have a provision analogous to section 1345.12(A) of the Ohio Revised Code.
In Connection With A Consumer Transaction
Another concern which needs to be addressed is whether collection suits
are acts or practices committed in connection with a consumer transaction as
1mOHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.1 I(B) (Page 1979).
1'OHio R. Civ. P. 3.
"Cf. West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 581-82 (W.D. Va. 1983) (interpreting similar exemption contained
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required by sections 1345.02 and 1345.03 of the Revised Code. While the retail
seller who extends its own credit can hardly argue that enforcing installment
payments is not part of the consumer transaction, other parties less closely
connected with the actual sales transaction might attempt to remove
themselves from the CSPA's coverage by virtue of the fact that they have no
connection with the "consumer transaction" since their role is merely ancillary
to the actual sale, lease or other act. This argument, too, deserves little recognition by the courts. Ohio legislators made it clear that any unfair, deceptive or
unconscionable act committed by a supplier is in violation of the CSPA
"whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction."' 6 The United
Research court seized upon this phrase in holding that the CSPA was applicable to the activities of an assignee debt collector. 07 It is very important
that consumer protection statutes reach a wide range of activities and persons
so that suppliers cannot avoid the law through various tactics of distancing
themselves from the original sale or other underlying transaction. As the court
in Liggins recognized:
[A] supplier engaged in the business of enforcing or attempting to enforce
the payment of a claim or debt owed by a consumer to the supplier cannot
relieve itself of the prohibition provided for in the Code by merely assigning or transferring said claim to an assignee or agent or agency, and have
that assignee, agent or agency conduct practices prohibited by the act. To
permit said supplier to contend that the transfer of the collection of said
debt relieves it from the obligations prohibited, and for the other person to
whom it is transferred to say that it is not covered under the prohibitions
the very purpose for which the Consumer Protecof the act, would defeat
20 8
enacted.
was
tion Act
Unfairness
Assuming other statutory hurdles have been overcome, a party using the
CSPA to sue a distant forum abuser still must show by some measure that the
act or practice involved is unfair, deceptive or unconscionable. One lower
court in Ohio has declared the "regular" practice of suing in distant forums to
be unconscionable, °9 and although this term is separate from the term "unfair"
under the CSPA, the semantic distinctions are less important than the legal
proscriptions. As discussed above, it was held in United Research that the
practice of suing consumers in distant forums was unfair under the CSPA.11
There is also an abundance of precedent from other jurisdictions to sug2

tOHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.02(A), 1345.03(A) (Page 1979).
lu'
United Research, 190 Ohio App. 3rd at 51, 482 N.E.2d at 1262.
'mLiggins, 44 Ohio Misc. at 83-87, 337 N.E.2d at 818.
10Santiago v.S.S. Kresge Co., 2 Ohio Op. 3d 54 (19761.
21uUnited Research, 19 Ohio App. 3rd at 51, 482 N.E.2d at 1262.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/2

36

Chen: Due Process as Consumer Protection
Summer, 19861

DUE PROCESS As CONSUMER PROTECTION

gest the general unfairness of distant forum suits for the collection of consumer
debts. Ohio's CSPA provides that in construing what is unfair or deceptive
under section 1345.02(A), courts "shall give due consideration and great
weight to federal trade commission orders, trade regulation rules and guides,
and the federal courts' interpretations of subsection 45(a)(1) of the 'Federal
Trade Commission Act,' .
,,2* Thus, Ohio courts can look to the Spiegel
decision of the Seventh Circuit which suggested that at least in some circumstances intrastate distant forum suits on consumer debts could fall within
the proscriptions of the FTCA's "unfair or deceptive acts" section. 2, Furthermore, the FTC Distant Forum Orders issued in the 1970s must be given "great
weight" by the Ohio courts. At least one of those orders specifically enjoined
intrastate distant forum suits that had been regularly filed by the
213
respondents.
Other sources, although not specifically referred to by the CSPA, also
contribute to the view that distant forum suits are unfair. The federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act declares that any violation of its provisions, including the one which limits collection suits to non-distant forums, is an unfair
or deceptive act. 14 The state of Texas, by statute, has declared distant forum
suits to be "false, misleading or deceptive, 2 5' terms which, read in conjunction
with each other, present a strong suggestion of unfairness. Furthermore, the
decisions in Barquis and Schubach, while not going so far as to say distant
forum abuse is unfair, condemn the regular use of such suits for the collection
of consumer debts.216
While there might be a slight problem of overbreadth in a per se declaration of unfairness with respect to distant forum suits, it should be of little concern to the courts. Despite the fact that the restriction of suits to the place of
the consumer's residence or where the consumer signed the actual contract
would mean that suits in adjacent or otherwise nearby counties or judicial
districts would be considered "unfair" as a matter of law, it is better to prohibit
suits outside of these designated appropriate counties altogether than to require courts to engage in line-drawing. And though it is understandable for
creditors and other debt collectors to desire centralization of their legal actions
in pursuit of allegedly overdue debts, their interests are significantly outweighed by the legitimate social objective of fairness in consumer litigation. It
would be relatively inexpensive for larger retailers or creditors to hire local
'"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page 1979).

"'Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 296 n.12 (7th Cir. 1976).
"'In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 84 F.T.C. 1337 (1974) (enjoining distant forum suits within Alaska).
2,115 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982). The suggestion is also contained in the Senate Report which accompanied the
FDCPA's enactment. The report expressly states that forum abuse is an unfair practice. S. Rep. No. 95-382,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONc.. & AD. NEWS 1695, 1699.
"'TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(22) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
"16Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
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counsel where the consumers are located in order to handle simple debt collection matters. As for the smaller businesses, which may include a great deal of
the home solicitation suppliers, there should be a presumption that if they are
willing to participate in business transactions which involve dealings with consumers residing in distant counties (and which often arise from the suppliers'
solicitation of sales in those counties), that they are willing to file collection
suits, if necessary, in those counties.
Consumer suits by both the Attorney General of Ohio and private consumers should be instituted wherever distant forum abuse is detected so that a
clear case law development will occur. Courts would be well advised to follow
the recent appellate decision in UnitedResearch, as well as the lower court rulings on distant forum abuse in Ohio, in condemning this unfair and oppressive
debt collection tactic. While this will still leave uncovered the financial institutions and dealers in intangibles exempted from the CSPA, it will serve the purpose of prohibiting distant forum suits by a large percentage of debt collection
plaintiffs.
Should the litigation route prove unfavorable to consumer advocates, it
would be left to the Ohio legislature to enact some sort of amendment to the
existing statutory scheme to deal with distant forum abuse. Rather than attempting to limit the venue rules, it would probably be more practical to either
amend the CSPA to include distant forum suits as one of the enumerated "unfair or deceptive" acts or to revise the Ohio Retail Installment Sales Act" 7 to include a special limitation on venue for suits on retail installment sales contracts
and accounts (similar to California's Unruh Act). However, in enacting such
amendments, the potential for circumvention by contractual clauses in preprinted form contracts must also be addressed, such that consumers' rights to
be sued in the forum of their residence or where they signed their contracts
cannot be waived or altered in any way."' It is time that Ohio consumers were
protected from the patently unfair debt collection practice of distant forum
suits. Moreover, other states should follow the lead of states such as Texas,
California and Massachusetts, in engaging the aid of the courts and the
legislature to eradicate this pervasive attempt to deprive consumers of their opportunity to be heard and to assert their defenses.

27

' OH1O REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.01-1317.16, 1317.99. (Page 1979 & Page Supp. 1985).
"'The Retail Installment Sales Act already has a provision declaring void contractual provisions purporting
to waive the buyer's defenses. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.14 (Page Supp. 1985).
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